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Foreword
How should we judge those who would be judges? That is
the central question addressed by this Symposium.' Plato concluded that "[t]he judge should not be young; he should have
learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and
long observation of the nature of evil in others." ' 2 Francis Bacon
thought that "[j]udges ought to be more learned than witty,
more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident." ' 3 And Alexander Hamilton observed that "there can be
but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges." ' 4 We expect a
great deal, therefore, from those among us who are selected to
sit in judgment.
This Symposium is not the first,5 nor should it be the last,
on the selection and election of judges. It brings to the literature,
however, something unique. It treats the subject matter by joining the political science and legal disciplines. This type of interdisciplinary approach is becoming increasingly important to the
study of law; indeed, Judge Richard Posner concludes "that
unless the academic lawyer borrows the methods and insights of
other fields, he will lose his right to dominate legal studies.''6 A
consideration of how we select and elect our judges is particularly well suited to a union between legal scholarship and the
more empirically based approach of the political scientist.
In the United States, choosing judges is accomplished by
both selection and election. While their theoretical underpinnings
The articles and comments contained in this symposium issue were presented on
September 15-16, 1988, at the University of Kentucky College of Law. The symposium
was co-sponsored by the University of Kentucky Department of Political Science.
2 REPUBLIC OF PLATO 97 (B. Jowett trans. 1888).
3 F. BACON, Of Judicature, in BACON'S ESSAYS 365 (S.H. Reynolds ed. 1890).
4Tim FEDERALIST

No. 78, at 434 (Smith ed. 1901).

See Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HA~v. L. REv.
1146 (1988); USC Symposium on JudicialElection, Selection, and Accountability, 61 S.
CAL. L. Ray. 1555 (1988).
6

R.

POSNER, LAW AND Lrraa-uRE: A IVSUNDERSTOOD RELATION
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may differ, both methods have the same goal of obtaining an
independent, well qualified, yet accountable judiciary. This Symposium collects articles on judicial election and appointment at
the state level as well as on the selection and confirmation of
federal judges. Thus, the reader is presented with a complete
picture of the current procedural alternatives.
As a result of President Reagan's controversial nomination
of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, the Senate confirmation of Supreme Court justices came finally to be recognized
by the American citizenry as something more than just a formalistic duty of the Senate buried deep in some obscure part of
the Constitution. Indeed, the process took on a dimension seldom known to it: the organized and heightened attention of the
American public. Although the American public's sudden interest in the confirmation process involving Bork and Ginsberg
may possibly be explained away as contextual, the intense debate
among scholars concerning this process presents many complex
and important questions about how the Supreme Court justices,
as well as other federal judges, of the United States should be
chosen.
Not the least of these many questions is the extent to which
a senator's ideology may affect his or her voting on nominations.
Professors Segal, Cover, and Cameron investigate the role that
ideology may or may not play in the confirmation process. The
article uses a cost-benefit analysis and concludes that, although
most senators prefer to vote ideologically on Supreme Court
nominations, most usually do not in fact vote ideologically.
Professor Weisberg and Mr. Felice, however, using a different
analytical approach from Professors Segal, Cover, and Cameron, do find a consistency in senators' voting over time due to
ideological philosophy.
Mr. Rader, in his article, 7 offers careful advice against the
dangers of what he calls the politicalization of the confirmation
process. Mr. Rader, a former counsel to the United States Senate
Judiciary Committee, suggests that a system of established guide-

Due to space constraints, Mr. Rader's article will appear in the fourth issue of
Volume 77. After participating in this symposium, Mr. Rader became a Judge on the
United States Claims Court.
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lines should be followed by the Senate with regard to any inquiry
into the ideology of a particular nominee. To do otherwise would
possibly diminish the independence of the judiciary.
Section II of the Symposium provides two interesting perspectives on the selection of federal judges. Professor Fish explores the concept of spite nominations to the Supreme Court
by the president as a form of retaliation for the defeat of a first
nominee. Professor Fish states that such presidential revenge is
often a motivating force behind Supreme Court nominations and
is a pervasive element in American judicial selection politics.
Professor Atkins offers a comparison between the judicial recruitment processes and the role performed by judiciaries in
both the American and English political systems.
Section III of the Symposium focuses on the judicial election
and the appointment of judges at the state level. Although
perhaps not as apt to evoke the same public fervor or to possess
the same political dynamics as Senate confirmation of federal
judges, the selection of judges on the state level is nevertheless
just as fundamental to American jurisprudence. Indeed, one
could argue that the selection process on the state level presents
an even greater urgency in its need for reexamination.
Professor Baum examines the behavior of voters in judicial
elections in the context of the 1986 Ohio Supreme Court contest.
Specifically, Professor Baum focuses on the effect of various
forms of information obtained by voters on their actual voting
behavior. He finds that voter information may vary considerably
with regard to certain choices, depending on the controversy or
publicity surrounding any particular race. As a result many
voters may base their decisions in judicial elections on fairly low
levels of information.
Professor Alfini and Mr. Brooks explore the ethical parameters in which candidates for state judicial seats must conduct
their campaigns. The article proposes that the ABA's Code of
Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 7, does not achieve the
goal of proper adherence to the underlying principles of the
electoral process nor does it preserve the appearance of judicial
impartiality.
Lastly, Professor Davidow offers a creative approach to the
selection of state judges. He proposes that state judges should
be chosen by lot from a large number of nominees chosen by
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commissioners who are broadly representative of the entire community. This proposition, Professor Davidow concludes, is based
on the premise that judges are like jurors and should therefore
be more representative of the community as well as free from
the pressures of majority sentiment.
The current debate and intense scrutiny regarding the process
by which members of the judiciary are chosen should have as
its most cherished goal the attainment of increasingly more
qualified judges. It should be recognized, however, that underlying this controversy is our unceasing quest for true justice and
the inevitable frustrations we feel when the limitations of those
who are called upon by society to administer it are exposed.

